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Distributed generalized Nash equilibrium seeking in
aggregative games on time-varying networks
Giuseppe Belgioioso, Angelia Nedic´ and Sergio Grammatico
Abstract—We design the first fully-distributed algorithm for
generalized Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games on
a time-varying communication network, under partial-decision
information, i.e., the agents have no direct access to the aggregate
decision. The algorithm is derived by integrating dynamic track-
ing into a projected pseudo-gradient algorithm. The convergence
analysis relies on the framework of monotone operator splitting
and the Krasnosel’skii–Mann fixed-point iteration with errors.
I. INTRODUCTION
A
N aggregative game is a collection of inter-dependent
optimization problems associated with noncooperative
decision makers, or agents, where each agent is affected
by some aggregate effect of all the agents [1]. Remark-
ably, aggregative games arise in several applications, such
as demand side management in the smart grid [2], e.g. for
charging/discharging electric vehicles [3], demand-response
regulation in competitive markets [4], congestion control in
traffic and communication networks [5]. The common denomi-
nator is the presence of a large number of selfish agents, whose
aggregate actions may disrupt the shared infrastructure, e.g. the
power grid or the transportation network, if left uncontrolled.
Designing solution methods for multi-agent equilibrium
problems in noncooperative games has recently gained high
research interest. Several authors have developed semi-
decentralized and distributed equilibrium seeking algorithms
for games without coupling constraints [6], and for games with
coupling constraints [7], [8], [9], [10].
With focus on the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE)
problem, the formulations in [9], [10] have introduced an
elegant approach based on monotone operator theory [11]
to characterize the equilibrium solutions as the zeros of
a monotone operator. Not only is the monotone-operator-
theoretic approach general – e.g., unlike variational inequali-
ties, smoothness of the cost functions is not required – but also
computationally viable, since several algorithmic methods to
solve monotone inclusions are already well established, e.g.
operator-splitting methods [11, §26].
However, in the aforementioned literature on noncoopera-
tive equilibrium computation, it is assumed that the agents
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have direct access to the decisions of all their competitors,
allowing every agent to evaluate its cost function without the
need of extra communication. This game setup is known as
full-decision information.
Recently, in the broader context of network games, the
authors in [12], [13] propose fully-distributed algorithms for
equilibrium seeking under partial-decision information. In
[12], to deal with the lack of information, the agents are
endowed with auxiliary variables, namely, the estimates of
the decisions of the other agents. Then, a consensus proto-
col is combined with accelerated projected-pseudo-gradient
dynamics to steer the estimates towards their real value and,
consequently, the decisions to a Nash equilibrium, in the same
time-scale. In [13], similar ideas are developed in the general
framework of monotone operator theory to design an algorithm
for games with coupling constraints. The algorithms proposed
in [12], [13] require a number of auxiliary variables (namely
the estimates of the decisions of the other agents) which is
proportional to the number of agents in the game. From a
practical perspective, this can be regarded as a drawback in
terms of memory storage and communication requirements,
especially in games with very large number of agents.
Scalability with respect to the population size indeed mo-
tivates us to focus on aggregative games. In this context, the
authors in [14] propose an algorithm that relies on dynamic
tracking, a technique extensively used in distributed optimiza-
tion [15]. Specifically, the authors embed dynamic tracking
of the aggregate decision in a projected-pseudo-gradient up-
date to compute a Nash equilibrium in aggregative games
without coupling constraints, in a fully-distributed fashion.
Unfortunately, the extension of the methodology in [14] to
generalized Nash equilibrium problems currently is missing,
since it presents several technical issues. In the context of
aggregative games with coupling constraints, an algorithm
is proposed in [16], however with important limitations: it
requires a very large number of distributed communication
rounds before each strategy update; convergence is guaranteed
to approximate solutions (i.e., ε−Nash equilibria) only; the
communication network must be time-invariant.
Contribution: In this paper, we propose the first discrete-
time, fully-distributed algorithm to compute a generalized
Nash equilibrium in aggregative games with coupling con-
straints, over a time-varying communication network, under
partial-decision information. The algorithm is obtained by
combining dynamic tracking, projected-pseudo-gradient and
Krasnosel’skii–Mann dynamics. The key approach to prove
convergence of our proposed algorithm relies on applying and
tailoring the framework of operator splitting methods [11] and
fixed-point iteration with errors [17].
Organization of the paper: In Section II, we formalize the
generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem for aggregative
games over a time-varying communication network. In Sec-
tion III, we present a fully-distributed algorithm and discuss
its interpretation from an operator theoretic and fixed-point
perspective. In Section IV, we establish global convergence
of the proposed method. To corroborate the theory, in Section
V, we study the performance of the proposed method on a
Nash–Cournot game. Concluding remarks and future research
directions are discussed in Section VI.
Basic notation: R denotes the set of real numbers, and
R := R∪{∞} the set of extended real numbers. 0 (1) denotes
a matrix/vector with all elements equal to 0 (1); to improve
clarity, we may add the dimension of these matrices/vectors
as subscript. A ⊗ B denotes the Kronecker product between
the matrices A and B. For a square matrix A ∈ Rn×n, its
transpose is A⊤; A ≻ 0 ( 0) stands for positive definite
(semidefinite) matrix. Given A ≻ 0, ‖ · ‖A denotes the A-
induced norm, such that ‖x‖A =
√
x⊤Ax. ‖A‖ denotes the
largest singular value of A. Given N matrices A1, . . . , AN ,
blkdiag(A1, . . . , AN ) denotes a block diagonal matrix with
A1, . . . , AN as diagonal blocks. Given N vectors x1, . . . , xN ,
x := col (x1, . . . , xN ) = [x
⊤
1 , . . . , x
⊤
N ]
⊤, x¯ = 1N
∑N
i=1 xi,
x−i := col(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN ); given a vector z,
(z,x−i) := col(x1, . . . , xi−1, z, xi+1, . . . , xN ).
Operator theoretic definitions: Id(·) denotes the identity
operator. The mapping ιS : R
n → {0, ∞} denotes the
indicator function for the set S ⊆ Rn, i.e., ιS(x) = 0 if x ∈ S,
∞ otherwise. For a closed set S ⊆ Rn, the mapping projS :
R
n → S denotes the projection onto S, i.e., projS(x) =
argminy∈S ‖y − x‖. The set-valued mapping NS : Rn ⇒ Rn
denotes the normal cone operator for the set S ⊆ Rn, i.e.,
NS(x) = ∅ if x /∈ S,
{
v ∈ Rn | supz∈S v⊤(z − x) ≤ 0
}
otherwise. For a function ψ : Rn → R, dom(ψ) := {x ∈
R
n | ψ(x) < ∞}; ∂ψ : dom(ψ) ⇒ Rn denotes its
subdifferential set-valued mapping, defined as ∂ψ(x) := {v ∈
R
n | ψ(z) ≥ ψ(x) + v⊤(z − x) for all z ∈ dom(ψ)}. A
set-valued mapping F : Rn ⇒ Rn is (strictly) monotone if
(u − v)⊤(x − y) ≥ (>) 0 for all x 6= y ∈ Rn, u ∈ F(x),
v ∈ F(y); F is restricted (strictly) monotone on Y ⊂ Rn if
(z∗ − z)⊤(x∗ − x) ≥ (>)0 for all ∀x∗ ∈ Y , x ∈ Rn \ Y ,
z∗ ∈ F(x∗), x ∈ F(x); F is η−strongly monotone, with
η > 0, if (u− v)⊤(x− y) ≥ η ‖x− y‖2 for all x 6= y ∈ Rn,
u ∈ F(x), v ∈ F(y); fix (F) := {x ∈ Rn | x ∈ F(x)}
and zer (F) := {x ∈ Rn | 0 ∈ F(x)} denote the set of fixed
points and of zeros, respectively. A single-valued mapping
F : Rn → Rn is L-Lipschitz continuous, with L > 0,
if ‖F (x) − F (y)‖ ≤ L‖x − y‖ for all x, y ∈ Rn; F
is nonexpansive if it is 1-Lipschitz continuous; F is η-
averaged, with η ∈ (0, 1), if ‖F (x)− F (y)‖2 ≤ ‖x− y‖2 −
1−η
η ‖(Id− F ) (x) − (Id− F ) (y)‖2, for all x, y ∈ Rn; F is
β-cocoercive, with β > 0, if βF is 12 -averaged.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a set of N agents indexed by I = {1, . . . , N}.
The i-th agent is characterized by a local strategy set Ωi ⊂ Rn
and a cost function Ji(xi, x¯), which depends on the decision
of agent i, xi, and on the aggregate of all agent decisions, i.e.,
x¯ := 1N
∑N
i=1 xj .
Moreover, we assume that the collective strategy profile x :=
col(x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ RnN must satisfy a coupling constraint,
described by the affine function x 7→ Cx − c, where C =
[C1| . . . |CN ] ∈ Rm×nN , c =
∑N
i=1 ci ∈ Rm, and Ci, ci
are local parameters known to agent i only. In summary, the
aim of each agent i, given the decision variables of the other
agents, i.e., x−i := col(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN ), is to
choose a strategy xi that solves its local optimization problem,
according to the game setup above, i.e., ∀i ∈ I :

argmin
xi∈Rn
Ji(xi,
1
N xi +
1
N
∑
j 6=i xj)
s.t. xi ∈ Ωi
Cixi − ci ≤
∑N
j 6=i(cj − Cjxj)
(1)
where the last constraint is equivalent to Cx− c ≤ 0.
Assumption 1: For all i ∈ I and any fixed u ∈ 1N
∑N
j 6=i Ωj ,
the function Ji(· , 1N ·+ u) is convex and continuously differ-
entiable, Ωi ⊂ Rn is non-empty, compact and convex. The
global feasible set K := {x ∈ ∏Ni=1 Ωi|Cx − c ≤ 0} is
non-empty and satisfies Slater’s constraint qualification. 
From a game-theoretic perspective, our goal is to distribu-
tively compute a generalized Nash equilibrium of the aggrega-
tive game described by the N inter-dependent optimization
problems in (1).
Definition 1 (Generalized Nash equilibrium): A collective
strategy x∗ is a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) of the
game in (1) if x∗ ∈ K and, for all i ∈ I and for all z such
that (z,x∗−i) ∈ K ,
Ji (x
∗
i , x¯
∗) ≤ Ji
(
z, 1N z +
1
N
∑N
j 6=i x
∗
j
)
. 
A. Communication networks
We consider a time-varying network to model the commu-
nications among agents over time. At each stage k, the com-
munication is described by an undirected graph Gk = (I, Ek),
where I is the set of vertices (agents) and Ek ⊆ I × I is the
set of edges. An unordered pair of vertices (i, j) belongs to
Ek if and only if agents j and i can exchange information.
The set of neighbors of agent i at stage k is defined as
Ni(k) = {j| (i, j) ∈ Ek}. Next, we assume the graphs
sequence {Gk}k∈N to be Q−connected.
Assumption 2: There exists an integer Q ≥ 1 such that the
graph (I,∪Qℓ=1Eℓ+k) is connected, for all k ≥ 0. 
This assumption ensures that the intercommunication in-
tervals are bounded for agents that communicate directly. In
other words, every agent sends information to each of its
neighboring agents at least once every Q time intervals.
We consider a mixing matrix W (k) = [wi,j(k)] associated
with Gk , whose elements satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 3: For all k ∈ N, the matrix W (k) = [wi,j(k)]
satisfies the following conditions:
(i) (Edge utilization) Let i, j ∈ I, i 6= j. If (i, j) ∈ Ek,
wi,j(k) ≥ ǫ, for some ǫ > 0; wi,j(k) = 0 otherwise;
(ii) (Positive diagonal) For all i ∈ I, wi,i(k) ≥ ǫ;
(iii) (Double-stochasticity) W (k)1 = 1, 1⊤W (k) = 1⊤. 
Assumption 3 is strong but typical for multiagent coordina-
tion and optimization [18]. For an undirected graph it can be
fulfilled, for example, by using Metropolis weights:
wi,j(k) =


(max{|Ni(k)|, |Nj(k)|})−1 if (i, j) ∈ Ek,
0 if (i, j) 6∈ Ek,
1−∑ℓ∈Ni wi,ℓ(k) if i = j.
(2)
Finally, let us introduce the transition matrices Ψ(k, s) from
time s to k:
Ψ(k, s) =W (k)W (k − 1) · · ·W (s+ 1)W (s), (3)
for 0 ≤ s < k, where Ψ(k, k) = W (k), for all k. The
following statement shows the convergence properties of the
transition matrix Ψ(k, s).
Lemma 1 ([19, Lemma 5.3.1]): Let Assumptions 2, 3 hold
true. Then, the following statements hold:
(i) limk→∞Ψ(k, s) = (1/N)11
⊤, for all s ≥ 0.
(ii) The convergence rate of Ψ(k, s) is geometric, i.e.,
‖Ψ(k, s) − (1/N)11⊤‖ ≤ θρk−s for all k ≥ s ≥ 0,
where θ := N(1− ǫ/(4N2))−2 and
ρ := (1 − ǫ4N2 )1/Q ∈ (0, 1), (4)
with Q as in Assumption 2 and ǫ as in Assumption 3. 
B. GNE as zeros of a monotone operator
As first step, we characterize a GNE of the game in terms
of the KKT conditions of the coupled optimization problems
in (1). For each agent i ∈ I, let us introduce the Lagrangian
function Li, defined as
Li(x, λi) := Ji(xi, x¯) + ιΩi(xi) + λ
⊤
i (Cx− c),
where λi ∈ Rm≥0 is the dual variable of agent i associated with
the coupling constraints, and ιΩi is the indicator function. It
follows from [20, §12.2.3] that the set of strategies x∗ is a
GNE of the game in (1) if and only if the following coupled
KKT conditions are satisfied for some λ1, . . . , λN ∈ Rm≥0:
∀i ∈ I :
{
0 ∈ ∇xiJi(x∗i , x¯∗) + NΩi(x∗i ) + C⊤i λ∗i ,
0 ≤ λ∗i ⊥ −(Cx∗ − c) ≥ 0.
(5)
The next proposition characterizes the subclass of varia-
tional generalized Nash equilibria (v-GNE) as the solution set
of the KKT conditions in (5) with equal dual variables, i.e.,
λ∗1 = . . . = λ
∗
N , or equivalently as the solution to a specific
variational inequality1, or equivalently as the zero set of the
set-valued mapping
U :
[
x
λ
]
7→
[
NΩ(x) + F (x) + C
⊤λ
NRm
≥0
(λ) − (Cx− c)
]
, (6)
1For a single-valued mapping M : Rn → Rn and a set S ⊆ Rn, the
variational inequality problem VI(M,S) is the problem of finding a vector
ω∗ ∈ S such that M(ω∗)⊤(ω − ω∗) ≥ 0, for all ω ∈ S , [21, Def. 1.1.1].
where λ ∈ Rm, Ω := ∏Ni=1 Ωi, NS = ∂ιS is the normal
cone operator associated with a set S and F is the so-called
pseudo-gradient (PG) mapping defined as
F (x) = col(∇x1J1(x1, x¯), . . . ,∇xNJN (xN , x¯)). (7)
To emphasize the structure of F , we define
Fi(xi, x¯) := ∇xiJi(xi, x¯), ∀i ∈ I, (8)
and the extended PG mapping
F˜ (x,u) := col(F1(x1, u1), . . . , FN (xN , uN )), (9)
where each component mapping Fi is given by (8). With this
notation, we have F˜ (x,1 ⊗ x¯) = F (x). Next, we assume
Lipschitz continuity of the mapping F˜ in (9), which is usual
in the context of games under partial-decision information, see
e.g. [13, Assumption 3], [14, Assumption 3].
Assumption 4: The mapping F˜ in (9) is uniformly Lipschitz
continuous over Ω× Ω¯, where Ω¯ :=∏Ni=1( 1N ∑Ni=1Ωi), i.e.,
there exists some LF˜ > 0 such that, for all x,y ∈ Ω and
v,w ∈ Ω¯,
‖F˜ (x,v)− F˜ (y,w)‖ ≤ LF˜ ‖ [ xv ]− [ yw ] ‖.

Proposition 1: Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, the following
statements are equivalent:
(i) x∗ is a variaitonal GNE of the game in (1);
(ii) ∃λ∗ ∈ Rm≥0 such that, the pair (x∗i , λ∗) is a solution to
the KKT in (5), for all i ∈ I;
(iii) x∗ is a solution to VI(F,K);
(iv) ∃λ∗ ∈ Rm≥0 such that col(x∗, λ∗) ∈ zer(U). 
Proof: The equivalences (i)⇔(ii)⇔(iii) are proven in [22,
Th. 3.1] while (iii)⇔(iv) follows by [23, Th. 3.1].
The following assumptions on the PG mapping are standard
(e.g. [8, Th. 3], [10, Assumption 2], [24, Assumption 3]) and
sufficient to ensure the convergence of standard GNE seeking
algorithms.
Assumption 5 (Cocoercive pseudogradient): The mapping
F in (7) is χ−cocoercive over Ω. 
When F is ξ−strongly monotone and LF−Lipschitz over
Ω, then F is also (ξ/L2F)−cocoercive over Ω. However,
in general, cocoercive mappings are not necessarily strongly
monotone, e.g. the gradient of a (non-strictly) convex function.
Remark 1 (Existence and uniqueness of a v-GNE): It fol-
lows by [25, Cor. 2.2.5] that VI(F ,K) has a non-empty and
compact solution set, since K is non-empty, compact and
convex and F is continuous, by Assumption 1. Furthermore,
when F is strictly monotone, then the solution to VI(F ,K),
(i.e., the v-GNE of the game), is unique [25, Th. 2.3.3]. 
C. Boundedness of the dual variables
In this section, we formally establish the boundedness of
the dual solution set of VI(F,K) or, equivalently, of the dual
part of the monotone inclusion col(x∗, λ∗) ∈ zer(U).
Lemma 2: Let Assumptions 1, 5 hold true. If col(x∗, λ∗) ∈
zer(U), then λ∗ ∈ D∗, where D∗ ⊂ Rm≥0 is bounded. 
Proof: The boundedness of the dual solution set D∗
follows by [23, Prop. 3.3] since VI(F , K) has a non-empty
solution set by Remark 1, there exists a vector x ∈ dom(F )
satisfying Slater’s contraint qualification by Assumption 1, and
the primal solution set of VI(F ,K) is bounded since Ω is
bounded by Assumption 1.
In the remainder of the paper, we assume that each agent
can estimate a superset of D∗. Let BD ≥ maxλ∈D∗ ‖λ‖∞ and
define D := {λ ∈ Rm≥0 |λj ≤ BD for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}}.
We have that D is bounded and D∗ ⊆ D. Furthermore,
it follows that the set of zeros of the operator U in (6)
corresponds to the set of zeros of the following operator with
bounded domain:
UD :
[
x
λ
]
7→
[
NΩ(x) + F (x) + C
⊤λ
ND(λ) − (Cx− c)
]
.
Remark 2: In the context of constrained distributed opti-
mization, an estimate of the optimal dual solution set can
be construct based on a Slater’s vector, see [26, §4.2], [27,
§3.A (2)]. The extension of these estimation methods to
generalized noncooperative games would rely on Lagrangian
duality theory for variational inequalities [23]. In practice, the
agents do not need an accurate estimate of the optimal dual
solution set D∗ and can simply construct a local superset D
by taking the upper bound BD large enough. 
D. A standard semi-decentralized algorithm
It follows by Proposition 1 that the original GNE seeking
problem corresponds to the following monotone inclusion
problem:
find ω∗ = col(x∗, λ∗) s.t. 0 ∈ UD(ω∗). (10)
Next, we recall a standard semi-decentralized GNE seeking
algorithm obtained by solving the monotone inclusion problem
in (10) by means of a preconditioned forward-backward (pFB)
splitting [24, Alg. 1].
ALGORITHM 1 Semi-decentralized v-GNE seeking∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
In parallel, for all i ∈ I :
xk+1i = projΩi
(
xki − αi(Fi(xki , x¯k) + C⊤i λk)
)
Central coordinator:
λk+1 = projD
(
λk + β(2Cxk+1 − Cxk − c))
If the step sizes {αi}i∈I and β are chosen small enough,
then the sequence (col(xk, λk))k∈N generated by Algorithm
1 converges to some col(x∗, λ∗) ∈ zer(U), where x∗ is a
v-GNE, see [24, Th. 1] for a formal proof of convergence.
Remark 3: Algorithm 1 is not distributed. In fact, at each
iteration k, a central coordinator is needed to:
(i) gather and broadcast the average strategy x¯k;
(ii) update and broadcast the dual variable λk. 
III. A DISTRIBUTED GNE SEEKING ALGORITHM
A. Towards a fully distributed algorithm
A first step towards a fully-distributed algorithm consists
of endowing each agent with a copy, λi, of the dual variable
and enforcing consensus on the local copies. Consider the set-
valued mapping T , obtained by augmenting UD with the local
copies of the dual variable:
T :
[
x
λ
]
7→
[
NΩ(x) + F (x) +
1
NC
⊤
f λ
ND(λ) + Łmλ− 1N (Cf x− cf)
]
, (11)
where λ = col(λ1, . . . , λN ), D =
∏N
i=1D, Cf = 1N ⊗ C,
cf = 1 ⊗ c, Łm = Ł ⊗ Im and Ł := IN − 1N 11⊤ represents
the projection onto the disagreement space.
Remark 4: When the local copies of the dual variable are
equal, i.e., λ ∈ D‖ := {1N ⊗ λ, |λ ∈ D}, the first row
block of T corresponds to that of UD, while each of the
N components of the second row block of T describes the
same slack complementarity condition, namely, the second row
block of UD. 
We note that the mapping T in (11) can be written as the
sum of two operators, i.e.,
T1 : col(x,λ) 7→ col(F (x),Łmλ+ 1N cf), (12)
T2 : col(x,λ) 7→ NΩ(x)×ND(λ) + S col(x,λ), (13)
where S is a skew-symmetric linear mapping defined as
S :=
1
N
[
0 C⊤f
−Cf 0
]
. (14)
The formulation T = T1+T2 is called splitting of T , and will
be exploited in different ways later on. The next lemma shows
that T2 is maximally monotone and that T1 is cocoercive and
strictly monotone with respect to the consensus subspace of
the dual variables, i.e., Ω×D‖.
Lemma 3: Let Assumptions 1, 5 hold true. The following
statements hold:
(i) T2 in (13) is maximally monotone on Ω×D;
(ii) T1 in (12) is δ−cocoercive, with 0<δ≤min{1, χ} and
restricted-strictly-monotone over Θ‖ := Ω × D‖, i.e.,
for all ω‖ ∈ Θ‖, ω ∈ (Ω × D) \ Θ‖, it holds that
(T1(ω)− T1(ω‖))⊤(ω − ω‖) > 0;
(iii) T is maximally monotone on Ω × D and restricted-
strictly-monotone over Θ‖. 
Proof: See Appendix A.
The next proposition exploits the restricted strict monotonic-
ity of T to shows that the v-GNE of the original game are fully
characterized by the zeros of T .
Proposition 2: Let Assumption 1 hold true. The following
statements hold:
(i) zer(T ) 6= ∅,
(ii) If col(x∗,λ∗) ∈ zer(T ), then x∗ is a v-GNE and λ∗ =
col(λ∗, . . . , λ∗), with λ∗ ∈ Rm≥0. 
Proof: See Appendix B.
To find a zero of T , we exploit a preconditioned version
of the forward-backward method [11, §25.6] on the splitting
(12)-(13), similarly to [10], [24], thus obtaining Algorithm 2.
ALGORITHM 2. Semi-decentralized v-GNE seeking
Initialization: For all i ∈ I: set x0i ∈ Ωi, λ0i ∈ Rm≥0; set αi,
βi and (γ
k)k∈N as in Assumption 6.
For all i ∈ I :∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Local projected pseudo-gradient update :∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
x˜ki = projΩi(x
k
i − αi(Fi(xki , x¯k) + C⊤i λ¯k)),
dki = 2Cix˜
k
i − Cixki − ci,
λ˜ki = projD
(
λki + βi(d¯
k − λki + λ¯k)
)
,
Local Krasnosel’skii–Mann process:∣∣∣∣∣ x
k+1
i = x
k
i + γ
k(x˜ki − xki ),
λk+1i = λ
k
i + γ
k(λ˜ki − λki ),
Remark 5: The local auxiliary variables di’s are introduced
to cast Algorithm 2 in a more compact form. 
The next theorem establishes global convergence of Algo-
rithm 2 to a v-GNE if the step-sizes are chosen according to
the following choices.
Assumption 6: Take 0 < δ ≤ min{1, χ}, where χ as in
Assumption 5. Set the global parameter τ > 12δ and denote
ν := 2δτ4δτ−1 ∈ (1/2, 1). Set the step-sizes as follows:
(i) 0 < αi ≤ (‖Ci‖+ τ)−1 for all i ∈ I,
(ii) 0 < βi ≤ ( 1N
∑N
j=1 ‖Cj‖+ τ)−1, for all i ∈ I,
(iii) (γk)k∈N such that γ
k ∈ [0, ν−1] for all k ∈ N and∑∞
k=0 γ
k(1 − νγk) =∞. 
Note that the design choice γk = 1, for all k ∈ N, always
satisfies Assumption 6 (iii).
Theorem 1: Let Assumptions 1, 5 hold. If the step-sizes
{αi, βi}i∈I and (γk)k∈N are set as in Assumption 6, then
the sequence (col(xk,λk))k∈N generated by Algorithm 2
converges to some col(x∗,λ∗) ∈ zer(T ), where x∗ is a v-
GNE of the game in (1). 
Proof: See Appendix C.
Remark 6 (Algorithm 2 as a fixed-point iteration): Our
convergence analysis is based on recasting the dynamics
generated by Algorithm 2 as the fixed-point iteration
ωk+1 = ωk + γk(R(ωk)− ωk), (k ∈ N) (15)
where ωk = col(xk,λk) is the stacked vector of the iterates
and R is the so-called pFB operator, defined as
R := (Id + Φ−1T2)
−1 ◦ (Id− Φ−1T1), (16)
where T1, T2 in (12)-(13) characterize the splitting of T , and
Φ is the so-called preconditioning matrix, here chosen as
Φ :=
[
α−1d − 1NC⊤f
− 1NCf β−1d
]
, (17)
αd := diag(α1, . . . , αN ) ⊗ In, βd := diag(β1, . . . , βN ) ⊗ In.
Then, we show that, if the step sizes in the main diagonal
of Φ are set according to Assumption 6, the mapping R is
averaged with respect to the Φ-induced norm, i.e., ‖ · ‖Φ.
Hence, the fixed-point iteration (15) converges to some ω∗ :=
col(x∗,λ∗) ∈ fix(R) = zer(T ), where x∗ is a v-GNE, see
Appendix C for a complete convergence analysis. 
To conclude this section, we note that the projected-pseudo-
gradient updates in Algorithm 2 can be cast compactly as
x˜k = proj
Ω
(
xk − αd(F˜ (xk, x¯k) + C⊤d λ¯k)
)
, (18)
λ˜
k
= projD
(
λk + βd(d¯
k − λk + λ¯k)), (19)
where
x¯k = 1⊗ x¯k, λ¯k = 1⊗ λ¯k, d¯k = 1⊗ d¯k
and Cd := blkdiag(C1, . . . , CN ).
We note that Algorithm 2 is not distributed, since the local
updating rule of each agent requires the knowledge of
(i) the average strategy, i.e., x¯k = 1N
∑N
j=1 x
k
j ,
(ii) the average dual variable, i.e., λ¯k = 1N
∑N
j=1 λ
k
j ,
(iii) the aggregate value d¯k = 1N
∑N
j=1 d
k
i , which charac-
terizes the violation of the coupling constraints, i.e.,
1
N
∑N
j=1 d
k
i =
1
N
∑N
j=1(2Cj x˜
k
j − Cjxkj − cj).
B. A fully-distributed algorithm via dynamic tracking
To implement Algorithm 2 fully-distributively over a time-
varying network, we approximate its updates by endowing
each agent i with some surrogate variables (or estimates), i.e.,
σi, yi and zi, that dynamically track the true aggregates x¯
k,
d¯k and λ¯k , respectively. Then, to mitigate the errors due to the
inexactness of the surrogate variables, we relax the projected-
pseudo-gradient iterations by means of a Krasnosel’skii–Mann
(KM) process [11, eq.(5.12)], whose step-sizes are set accord-
ing to the following design choice.
Assumption 7: The sequence (γk)k∈N satisfies the follow-
ing conditions:
(i) (non-increasing) 0 ≤ γk+1 ≤ γk ≤ 1, for all k ≥ 0;
(ii) (non-summable)
∑∞
k=0 γ
k =∞;
(iii) (square-summable)
∑∞
k=0 (γ
k)
2
<∞. 
For example, Assumption 7 is satisfied for step sizes of the
form γk = (k + 1)−b where 12 < b ≤ 1.
The proposed algorithm relies on agents constructing an
estimate of the aggregates by mixing information drawn from
local neighbors and making a subsequent relaxed projected-
pseudo-gradient step, as in Algorithm 2. To build the estimates
σi, yi, zi, at every iteration k, agent i receives σ
k
j ’s, y
k
j ’s, z
k
j ’s
from its neighbors, j ∈ Ni(k), and aligns its intermediate
estimates according to the following rules:
σˆki :=
N∑
j=1
wi,j(k)σ
k
j , yˆ
k
i :=
N∑
j=1
wi,j(k)y
k
j
zˆki :=
N∑
j=1
wi,j(k)z
k
j
Then, on the basis of σˆki , yˆ
k
i and zˆ
k
i , agent i updates its
strategy xk+1i , its dual variable λ
k+1
i and the new estimates
σk+1i , y
k+1
i , z
k+1
i as formalized in the next table that summa-
rizes the proposed algorithm.
ALGORITHM 3. Fully-distributed v-GNE seeking
Initialization: For all i ∈ I: set x−1i , x0i , x˜−1i ∈ Ωi, λ0i ∈ Rm≥0,
σ0i = x
0
i , z
0
i = λ
0
i , y
0
i = 2Cix˜
−1
i − Cix−1i − ci; αi, βi as in
Assumption 6 and (γk)k∈N as in Assumption 7.
For all i ∈ I :∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Communication and distributed averaging:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σˆki =
∑N
j=1 wi,j(k)σ
k
j ,
yˆki =
∑N
j=1 wi,j(k)y
k
j ,
zˆki =
∑N
j=1 wi,j(k)z
k
j ,
Local strategy update and dynamic tracking of d¯k :∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
x˜ki = projΩi(x
k
i − αi(Fi(xki , σˆki ) + C⊤i zˆki )),
yk+1i = yˆ
k
i + Ci(2x˜
k
i − xki )− Ci(2x˜k−1i − xk−1i ),
λ˜ki = projD
(
λki + βi(y
k+1
i − λki + zˆki )
)
,
Local Krasnosel’skii–Mann process:∣∣∣∣∣ x
k+1
i = x
k
i + γ
k(x˜ki − xki ),
λk+1i = λ
k
i + γ
k(λ˜ki − λki ),
Local dynamic tracking of x¯k+1 and λ¯k+1 :∣∣∣∣ σk+1i = σˆki + xk+1i − xki ,zk+1i = zˆki + λk+1i − λki .
Note that the projected-pseudo-gradient updates in Algo-
rithm 3 can be recast in a compact form as
x˜k = projΩ
(
xk − αd(F˜ (xk, σˆk) + C⊤d zˆk
)
, (20)
λ˜
k
= projD
(
λ
k + βd(y
k+1 − λk + zˆk)) (21)
where
σˆ
k = Wn(k)σ
k, zˆk = Wm(k)z
k, yˆk = Wm(k)y
k,
yk+1 = yˆk + Cd(2x˜
k − xk)− Cd(2x˜k−1 − xk−1).
and Wℓ(k) :=W (k)⊗ Iℓ for some ℓ ∈ N.
IV. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
To prove the convergence of Algorithm 3, we rely on
the framework of the inexact Krasnosel’skii–Mann fixed-point
iteration [17, Alg. 5.4]. Informally speaking, our goal is to
show that the error deriving from the inexactness of the
estimates σi’s, yi’s and zi’s goes to zero asymptotically, in
which case, also (xk)k∈N generated by Algorithm 3 globally
converges to a v-GNE. Technically, we aim at exploiting [17,
Th. 5.5], which establishes convergence of an inexact version
of the KM iteration in (15), i.e.,
ωk+1 = ωk + γk(R(ωk) + ek − ωk), ∀k ≥ 0, (22)
when R is nonexpansive and the step-size and error sequences,
(γk)k∈N and (e
k)k∈N, respectively, satisfy
(C.1)
∑∞
k=0 γ
k(1 − γk) =∞,
(C.2)
∑∞
k=0 γ
k
∥∥ek∥∥ <∞.
Note that Algorithm 3 corresponds to the KM with errors
in (22) where ωk = col(xk,λk) and the error at stage k is
ek = col(x˜k, λ˜
k
)− col(x˜kA2, λ˜
k
A2), (23)
where x˜kA2 and λ˜
k
A2 denote the iterates generated by Algorithm
2 (defined in (18) and (19), respectively). In other words,
ek represents the distance between the iterates in the ideal
case of full-decision information (i.e., the agents have an
exact knowledge of the true aggregates x¯k, d¯k and λ¯k) and
the iterates of Algorithm 3, in which the true aggregates are
replaced by the estimates σˆki , yˆ
k
i and zˆ
k
i .
The main technical challenge to invoke [17, Th. 5.5] and, in
turn, prove the convergence of Algorithm 3 is to find a step-
size sequence (γk)k∈N, that complies with (C.1), such that
the relaxed error sequence (γk‖ek‖)k∈N satisfies (C.2). We
immediately note that if (γk)k∈N is chosen as in Assumptions
7, then it already satisfies (C.1). In the following subsection,
we show that (C.2) is also satisfied.
A. Analysis of the relaxed error sequence
In the next lemma, we show a fundamental invariance
property of Algorithm 3, namely, at each stage k, the averages
among the estimates σki ’s, y
k
i ’s, and z
k
i ’s are equivalent to the
correspondent aggregate true values we aim to track.
Lemma 4: Let Assumption 3 hold true and set the initial
conditions σ0i , y
0
i , z
0
i as in Algorithm 3, for all i ∈ I. Then,
the following equations hold for all k ≥ 0:
(i) σ¯k = 1N
∑N
i=1 σ
k
i = x¯
k;
(ii) y¯k = 1N
∑N
i=1 y
k
i = d¯
k;
(iii) z¯k = 1N
∑N
i=1 z
k
i = λ¯
k. 
Proof: See Appendix D.
The next lemma provides upper bounds for the estimation
errors at each stage k of Algorithm 3.
Lemma 5: Let Assumptions 1-3 hold true. Then, there exist
some positive constants BΩ, BD, BY , δ1 and δ2 and a
vanishing scalar sequence (φk)k∈N defined as
φk = δ1ρ
k−1 + δ2
∑k
ℓ=1 ρ
k−ℓγℓ−1, (24)
with ρ as in (4) and (γk)k∈N as in Assumption 7, such that
the following upper bounds hold for all k ∈ N:
(i) ‖σˆk − 1⊗ x¯k‖ ≤ θBΩρk + θBΩ
∑k
s=1 ρ
k−sγs−1;
(ii) ‖zˆk − 1⊗ λ¯k‖ ≤ θBDρk + θBD
∑k
s=1 ρ
k−sγs−1;
(iii) ‖yk+1 − 1⊗ d¯k‖ ≤ θBY ρk +
∑k
s=1 ρ
k−sφs−1 + φk.
Proof: See Appendix E.
By exploiting the upper bounds in Lemma 5 and a result on
the convergence of scalar sequences, which is recalled next,
we can show that the estimates asymptotically converge to
their correspondent aggregate true values.
Lemma 6 ([28, Lemma 3.1]): Let (δk)k∈N be a sequence.
(a) If limk→∞ δ
k = δ and 0 < τ < 1, then
limk→∞
∑k
ℓ=0 τ
k−ℓδℓ = δ/(1− τ).
(b) If δk ≥ 0 for all k, ∑∞k=0 δk < ∞ and 0 < τ < 1, then∑∞
k=0
∑k
ℓ=0 τ
k−ℓδℓ <∞. 
Proposition 3: Let Assumptions 1-3 hold true. Then, the
following statements hold:
(i) limk→∞ ‖σˆk − 1⊗ x¯k‖ = 0;
(ii) limk→∞ ‖zˆk − 1⊗ λ¯k‖ = 0;
(iii) limk→∞ ‖yk+1 − 1⊗ d¯k‖ = 0. 
Proof: (i) From the upper bound in Lemma 5 (i), we have
lim sup
k→∞
‖(W (k)⊗ In)σk − 1⊗ x¯k‖
≤ lim sup
k→∞
(
θBΩρ
k + θBΩ
k∑
s=1
ρk−sγs−1
)
≤ 0,
where limk→∞ ρ
k = 0, since 0 < ρ < 1 by Lemma 1,
and limk→∞
∑k
s=1 ρ
k−sγs−1 = 0 by Lemma 6 (a), since
0 < ρ < 1 and limk→∞ γ
k = 0 by Assumption 7. Hence,
limk→∞ ‖σˆk − 1 ⊗ x¯k‖ = 0. The proofs of (ii) and (iii) are
analogous.
Next, we derive an upper bound for the error ek in (23) that
directly depends on the estimation errors in Lemma 5.
Lemma 7: Let Assumptions 1-3 hold true. Then, the fol-
lowing bound holds for all k ∈ N:
‖ek‖ ≤ ‖αd‖LF˜‖σˆk − 1⊗ x¯k‖+ ‖βd‖‖yk+1 − 1⊗ d¯k‖
+ (‖αd‖‖Cd‖+ ‖βd‖)‖zˆk − 1⊗ λ¯k‖.
Proof: See Appendix F.
Finally, by combining the upper bounds in Lemma 5 and 7
and exploiting a result on the convergence of scalar sequences,
i.e., Lemma 6 (b), we show that condition (C.2) holds, namely,
the relaxed error sequence (γk‖ek‖)k∈N is summable.
Lemma 8: Let Assumptions 1-3 hold true. The sequence
(γk‖ek‖)k∈N, with ek as in (23), is summable, i.e.,
∞∑
k=0
γk‖ek‖ <∞.
Proof: See Appendix G.
Now, we can prove the convergence of Algorithm 3.
Theorem 2: Let Assumptions 1-5 hold true, the step sizes
{αi, βi}i∈I be set as in Assumption 6, and (γk)k∈N as in
Assumption 7. Then, the sequence (col(xk,λk))k∈N generated
by Algorithm 3 globally converges to some col(x∗,λ∗) ∈
zer(T ), where x∗ is a v-GNE of the game in (1). 
Proof: For all k ∈ N, the iterations of Algorithm 3 can be
cast as the Krasnosel’skii–Mann process with errors ωk+1 =
ωk + γk(R(ωk) + ek − ωk), where ωk = col(xk,λk), R
as in (16) and ek as in (23). By [17, Th. 5.5], the sequence
(ωk)k∈N converges to some ω
∗ ∈ fix(R), since R is averaged,
thus nonexpansive, by Lemma 11, and (C.1)−(C.2) hold, by
Assumption 7 and Lemma 8, respectively. To conclude, we
note that ω∗ ∈ fix(R) = zer(Φ−1T1 +Φ−1T2), by [11, Prop.
25.1 (iv)], and that zer(Φ−1T1+Φ
−1T2) = zer(T ) 6= ∅, with
T as in (11), since Φ ≻ 0, by Lemma 9, and T1 + T2 = T .
Since ω∗ ∈ zer(T ), then x∗ is a v-GNE of the game in (1),
by Proposition 2 (ii).
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we study the performance of the proposed
algorithm on a class of network Nash–Cournot games with
market capacity constraints. Such games represent an instance
of generalized aggregative Nash games. In Section V-A, we
describe the player cost functions and strategy sets and verify
that the necessary assumptions are satisfied. In Section V-B,
we compare the performance of our algorithm against a
standard semi-decentralized method (Algorithm 1).
A. Generalized network Nash–Cournot game
We extend the network Nash–Cournot game model pro-
posed in [14, §IV] with additional market capacity constraints.
Specifically, consider N firms that compete over m markets.
Let firm i’s production and sales at location l be denoted by gi,l
and si,l, respectively, while its cost of production at location
l is denoted by fi,l(gi,l) and defined as follows:
fi,l(gi,l) = ai,lg
2
i,l + gi,lbi,l, (25)
where ai,l and bi,l are scaling parameters for agent i.
The goods sold by firm i at location l fetch a revenue
p(s¯l)si,l, where p(s¯l) denote the sales price at location l and
s¯l =
∑N
i=1 si,l represents the aggregate sales at location l. The
market price is set according to an inverse demand function
which depends on the aggregate of the network, i.e.,
pl(s¯l) = dl − s¯l,
where dl is the overall demand for location l. Each firm i
has a production limitation at location l, described by ui,l.
Moreover, the overall production in each market l must meet
the correspondent demand dl and do not exceed a maximum
capacity rl. Hence, the coupling constraints dl ≤
∑N
i=1 gi,l ≤
rl, for all l = 1, 2, . . . ,m, have to be satisfied.
Overall, each firm i, given the strategies of the other firms,
aims at solving the following optimization problem:

argmin
{gi,l,si,l}ml=1
∑m
l=1(fi,l(gi,l)− pl(s¯l)si,l)
s.t.
∑m
l=1 gi,l ≥
∑n
l=1 si,l,
gi,j , si,j ≥ 0, gi,l ≤ ui,l, l = 1, . . . ,m,
dl ≤
∑N
i=1 gi,l ≤ rl, l = 1, . . . ,m.
Effectively, the payoff function of firm i is parametrized by
nodal aggregate sales and its constraints depend on the other
firms’ strategies, thus leading to a generalized aggregative
game. In this example, we assume that the firms communicate
over a dynamic network to cope with the lack of aggregate
information, which is necessary to compute their optimal
production and sale strategies.
Next, we show that the proposed network Nash–
Cournot game does satisfy our technical setup. Let xi =
col(gi,1, . . . , gi,n, si,1, . . . , si,n) ∈ R2m denote the strategy
vector of agent i and x = col(x1, . . . , xN ) denote the
collective strategy profile. The cost function of agent i is
quadratic, convex in xi, continuously differentiable and can
be cast in a compact form as
Ji(xi, x¯) = x
⊤
i Aixi + b
⊤
i xi + (∆x¯)
⊤xi, (26)
where Ai := diag(ai,1, . . . , ai,m, 0, . . . , 0), ∆ = diag(0, Im)
and bi := col(bi,1, . . . , bi,m,−d1, . . . ,−dn). The local feasible
set of firm i is non-empty (for an adequate choice of ui,l’s ),
convex, compact and reads as Ωi := {xi ∈ R2n |
∑n
l=1 gi,l ≥∑n
l=1 si,l, gi,j , si,j ≥ 0, gi,l ≤ ui,l, l = 1, . . . ,m, }.
The coupling constraints are affine and can be written in
compact form as in (1), with Ci =
[
0 Im
0 −Im
]
and ci =
1
N col(r1, . . . , rm,−d1, . . . ,−dm), for all i ∈ I. Thus, As-
sumption 1 is satisfied.
The pseudo gradient mapping F is affine and reads as
F (x) = Px+ b, (27)
with
P = 2A+ 1N I ⊗∆+ 1N (11⊤ ⊗∆), (28)
A = blkdiag(A1, . . . , AN ) and b = col(bi, . . . , bN). By a
direct inspection of the eigenvalues of P , we can show that F
is strongly monotone and Lipschitz continuous, when the co-
efficients ai,j’s are positive. Hence, Assumption 5 is satisfied.
In particular, it follows by [25, p.79] that F is χ−cocoercive
with χ := ‖P‖−1. Moreover, since F is strongly monotone
and the sets Ωi are compact, it follows by Remark 1 that there
exists a unique v-GNE. The mapping F˜ is affine and reads as
F˜ (x,σ) = (2A+ 1N I ⊗∆)x+ (I ⊗∆)σ + b.
Similarly, it can be shown that F˜ is LF˜−Lipschitz continuous
with LF˜ := maxij{ai,j , 1}. Thus, Assumption 4 is satisfied.
B. Simulations studies
In our numerical study we consider a network Nash-Cournot
game played by 20 firms, i.e., N = 20, over 10 markets, i.e.,
m = 10. All the parameters of the game are drawn from
uniform distributions and fixed over the course of the entire
simulations. Specifically, for all i ∈ I and l ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
we set the parameters of production cost in (25) as ai,l ∈
U(2, 3) and bi,l ∈ U(2, 12), where U(t, τ) denotes the uniform
distribution over an interval [t, τ ] with t < τ . We set the
production capacities of firm i as ui,l ∈ U(50, 100) for all
l ∈ {1, . . . , n } and for all i ∈ I. Moreover, the demand at
market l is set as dl ∈ U(90, 100), while the market capacity
as rl ∈ U(dl, 2dl) for all l ∈ {1, . . . ,m }.
At each iteration k, the firms communicate according to a
randomly generated and connected small world, where each
node has 4 neighbors. To create a doubly stochastic mixing
matrixW (k), we exploit the Metropolis weighting rules in (2).
Thus, Assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied. The agents update
their decisions and their estimates as in Algorihtm 3. The step-
sizes {αi, βi}i∈I are set according to Assumption 6, where the
global parameter τ is set 5% larger than the theoretical lower
bound 12δ , where δ = min{1, ‖P‖} and P as in (28).
In Figure 1, we show the trajectories of the sequences
of normalized residuals ‖xk − x∗‖/‖x0 − x∗‖ for different
choices of the step-size sequence (γk)k∈N. Moreover, we
compare the trajectories of Algorithm 3 with those obtained
with Algorithm 1 [24, Alg. 1], which is a semi-decentralized
algorithm and works under the assumption of full-decision
information, i.e., the firms have access to the real aggregate
information at each stage k of the algorithm. As expected, the
semi-decentralized algorithm converges faster than the fully-
distributed counterpart. Interestingly, we notice that conver-
gence is achieved also in the case of fixed relaxation step in
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Fig. 1. The trajectories of the residual ‖xk−x∗‖/‖x0−x∗‖ for pFB [24,
Alg. 1], Alg. 3 with γk = k−0.51 and Alg. 3 with γk = 1.
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Fig. 2. The trajectories of the consensus disagreement ‖(Ł ⊗ Im)λ
k‖ for
Alg. 3 with γk = k−0.51 and Alg. 3 with γk = 1.
the KM process, e.g. γk = 1 for all k ≥ 0, which is not
supported by our theoretical analysis.
In Figure 2, we compare the trajectories of the consensus
disagreement of the dual variables ‖(Ł ⊗ Im)λk‖, for two
choices of the step-size sequence (γk)k∈N.
VI. CONCLUSION
For a general class of aggregative games with linear cou-
pling constraints over time-varying communication networks,
we have designed the first single-layer, fully-distributed algo-
rithm to compute a variational generalized Nash equilibrium.
Global convergence can be established via monotone-operator-
theoretic and fixed-point arguments, integrated with a dynamic
tracking methodology.
The analysis approach in this paper is genuinely novel,
hence opens up a number of new research directions. Mo-
tivated by the numerical results of Section V, it would be
valuable to explore the computational aspects of the proposed
method, e.g. how the connectivity of the communication
networks influences the convergence speed. Whether or not
the proposed algorithm converges with fixed step sizes in the
Krasnosel’skii-Mann process is currently an open question.
Finally, it would be highly valuable to relax the assumption
of double-stochasticity of the mixing matrices.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 3
(i) T2 is the sum of two terms: S in (17) which is a linear,
skew symmetric mapping, thus maximally monotone [11, Ex.
20.30]; and NΩ ×ND which is maximally monotone since is
the direct sum of maximally monotone operators [11, Prop.
20.23] (i.e, the normal cones of the closed convex sets Ω and
D). Hence, the maximal monotonicity of S+NΩ×ND = T2
follows by [11, Cor. 24.4 (i)] since dom(S) = R(n+m)N .
(ii) F is χ−cocoercive, by Assumption 5, and Łm is
1−cocoercive by [21, p.79], since Łm is a linear, positive semi-
definite mapping with ‖Łm‖ = 1. It follows that the direct sum
T1(·) = F (·) × (Łm · + 1N cf) is δ−cocoercive, for all δ such
that 0 < δ ≤ min{1, χ}. Now, we show that T1 is restricted
strictly monotone w.r.t. Θ‖. Let ω = col(x,λ) 6∈ Θ‖, hence
λ = λ‖ + λ⊥, with λ‖ ∈ D‖ and 0 6= λ⊥ ∈ D \D‖. Let
ω′ = col(x′,λ′) ∈ Θ‖, hence λ′ = λ′‖ ∈ D‖ and λ′⊥ = 0.
The following inequalities show that T1 in (13) is restricted
strictly monotone w.r.t. Θ‖:
(T2(ω)− T2(ω′))⊤(ω − ω′)
= (F (x)− F (x′))⊤(x− x′) + (λ− λ′)⊤Łm(λ − λ′)
≥ χ‖F (x)− F (x′)‖2 + (λ⊥)⊤Łmλ⊥
≥ eig2(Ł)‖λ⊥‖2 > 0,
where Łm = (Ł⊗ Im) and eig2(Ł) = 1 is the second smallest
eigenvalue of Ł = I − 1N 11⊤. The first inequality follows by
the cocoercivity of F (Assumption 5) and since λ‖
⊤Łm =
λ′
⊤
Łm = 0
⊤ and Łmλ‖ = Łmλ
′ = 0.
(iii): The maximal monotonicity of T = T1 + T2 follows
by [11, Cor. 24.4 (i)], since T1 is cocoercive (thus maximally
monotone [11, Example 20.31]), T2 is maximally monotone
and dom(T1) = R
(n+m)N . Moreover, since T1 is also
restricted-strictly monotone with respect to Θ‖ then T enjoys
the same property. 
B. Proof of Proposition 2
(i) By Proposition 1, there exists λ∗ ∈ Rm≥0 such that
col(x∗, λ∗) ∈ zer(U), where x∗ is a v-GNE. Define ω∗ =
col(x∗,λ∗), with λ∗ = 1N ⊗ λ∗, then we have T (ω∗) ∋ 0.
In fact, each component of the first row block of T (ω∗)
reads as NΩi(x
∗
i ) + ∇xiJi(x∗i , x¯∗) + C⊤i λ∗ ∋ 0. While,
each component of the second row block of T (ω∗) reads as
NRm
≥0
(λ∗)− 1N (Cx−c) ∋ 0, since NRm≥0(λ∗)−(Cx∗−c) ∋ 0
and 1NNRm≥0 = NR
m
≥0
. Hence, zer(T ) 6= ∅.
(ii) From the first part of the proof, we know that there
exists ω∗ ∈ Θ‖ such that ω∗ ∈ zer(T ). Now, we show that
all the zeros of T lie in Θ‖. By contradiction, let ω′ ∈ zer(T )
and assume ω′ /∈ Θ‖. Then, 0 ∈ T (ω∗), 0 ∈ T (ω′) and
Lemma 3 (iii) yields 0 = (0 − 0)⊤(ω∗ − ω′) > 0, which is
impossible. Therefore, ω′ ∈ Θ‖, namely ω′ = col(x′,1⊗λ′).
Now, by substituting ω′ into T (since (Ł⊗ Im)(1⊗ λ′) = 0)
we recover that ω′ ∈ zer(T ) ⇒ col(x′, λ′) ∈ zer(U), which,
by Proposition 1, holds if and only if x′ is a v-GNE. 
C. Proof of Theorem 1
To prove convergence of Algorithm 2 we follow the same
technical reasoning of the proof in [10, Alg. 1]. Specifically,
the proof is divided in two parts to show that:
(1) Algorithm 2 corresponds to the fixed-point iteration in
(15), i.e., ωk+1 = ωk + γk(R(ωk) − ωk), where R :=
(Id + Φ−1T2)
−1 ◦ (Id − Φ−1T1) is the so-called pFB
operator.
(2) If the step sizes are set as in Assumption 6, then R is
an averaged operator. Hence, (15) globally converges to
some ω∗ := col(x∗λ∗) ∈ fix(R). Since fix(R) = zer(T ),
with T as in (11), then x∗ is a v-GNE, by Proposition 2.
(1): Let us recast Algorithm 2 in a compact form as
x˜k = projΩ
(
xk − αd(F˜ (xk, x¯k) + C⊤d λ¯k)
)
, (29)
λ˜
k
= projD
(
λk + βd(d¯
k − λk + λ¯k)) (30)
xk+1 = xk + γk(x˜k − xk), (31)
λk+1 = λk + γk(λ˜
k − λk), (32)
Since proj
Ω
= (Id + NΩ)
−1, F˜ (xk,1 ⊗ x¯k) = F (xk) and
C⊤d λ¯
k
= C⊤d (1 ⊗ λ¯k) = 1NC⊤f λk, it follows from (29) that
(Id+NΩ)(x˜
k) ∋ xk−αd(F (xk)+ 1NC⊤f λk), which leads to
− F (xk) ∈ NΩ(x˜k) + 1NC⊤f λ˜
k
+ α−1d (x˜
k − xk)− 1NC⊤f (λ˜
k − λk), (33)
where we used α−1d NΩ(x˜
k) = NΩ(x˜
k). Similarly, since 1⊗
d¯k = 1N (2Cfx˜
k −Cfxk − cf) and λk − λ¯k = ((I − 1N 11⊤)⊗
Im)λ
k = (Ł ⊗ Im)λk = Łmλk, it follows from (30) that
(Id+NRmN
≥0
)(λ˜
k
) ∈ λk+βd( 1N (2Cfx˜k−Cfxk−cf)−Łmλk),
which leads to
− Łmλk − 1N cf ∈ NRmN≥0 (λ˜
k
)− 1NCfx˜k
− 1NCf(x˜k − xk) + β−1d (λ˜
k − λk). (34)
Let ωk := col(xk,λk), then the inclusions in (33)−(34) can
be cast in compact form as
−T1(ωk) ∈ T2(ω˜k) + Φ(ω˜k − ωk), (35)
where T1, T2 and Φ as in (12), (13) and (17), respectively. By
making ω˜k explicit in (35), we obtain
ω˜k = (Id + Φ−1T2)
−1 ◦ (Id− Φ−1T1)(ωk), (36)
which corresponds to ω˜k = R(ωk), where R is the pFB
operator in (16). Finally, it follows by (31)−(32) that ωk+1 =
ωk + γk(R(ωk)− ωk), which concludes the proof.
(2): Next, we introduce some technical statements that we
exploit later on in this proof.
Lemma 9: Let the step-sizes {αi, βi}i∈I satisfy Assump-
tion 6. Then the following statements hold:
(i) Φ− τI  0, with τ as in Assumption 6,
(ii) ‖Φ−1‖ ≤ τ−1. 
Proof: (i): By the generalized Gershgorin circular theo-
rem [29, Th. 2], each eigenvalue µ of the matrix Φ in (17)
satisfies at least one of the following inequalities:
µ ≥ α−1i − ‖C⊤i ‖, ∀i ∈ I, (37)
µ ≥ β−1i − 1N
∑N
j=1 ‖C⊤j ‖, ∀i ∈ I. (38)
Hence, if we set the step-sizes αi, βi as in Assumption 6,
the inequalities (37)-(38) yield to µ ≥ τ . It follows that the
smallest eigenvalue of Φ, i.e., µmin(Φ), satisfies µmin(Φ) ≥
τ > 0. Thus, Φ− τI is positive semi-definite.
(ii): Let µmax(Φ) be the largest eigenvalue of Φ. We have
that µmax(Φ) ≥ µmin(Φ) ≥ τ . Moreover, ‖Φ‖ = µmax(Φ) ≥
µmin(Φ) =
1
‖Φ−1‖ ≥ τ . Hence ‖Φ−1‖ ≤ τ−1.
Lemma 10: Let Assumptions 1 and 5 hold and the step-
sizes {αi, βi}i∈I satisfy Assumption 6. The following prop-
erties hold in the Φ-induced norm (i.e., ‖ · ‖Φ):
(i) Φ−1T1 is δτ−cocoercive and (Id − Φ−1T1) is
1
2δτ−averaged;
(ii) Φ−1T2 is maximally monotone and (Id − Φ−1T2)−1 is
1
2−averaged. 
Proof: (i): Since T1 is single-valued and Φ
−1 nonsingular,
by Lemma 9 (i), for each ω,ω′ ∈ Ω× RnN≥0
‖Φ−1T1(ω)− Φ−1T1(ω′)‖2Φ = ‖T1(ω)− T1(ω′)‖2Φ−1
≤ ‖Φ−1‖ ‖T1(ω)− T1(ω′)‖2
≤ 1τ ‖T1(ω)− T1(ω′)‖2, (39)
where the last inequality follows by Lemma 9 (ii). By (39)
and the δ−cocoercivity of T1 (Lemma 3 (ii))
〈Φ−1T1(ω)− Φ−1T1(ω′),ω − ω′〉Φ =
〈T1(ω)− T1(ω′),ω − ω′〉 ≥ δ‖T1(ω)− T1(ω′)‖2
≥ δτ‖Φ−1T1(ω)− Φ−1T1(ω′)‖2Φ. (40)
In other words, Φ−1T1 is δτ−cocoercive in the Φ−induced
norm. It follows from [11, Prop. 4.33] that (Id − Φ−1T1) is
1
2δτ−averaged in the Φ−induced norm.
(ii): By [30, Lemma 3.7 (i)], Φ−1T2 is maximally monotone
in the Φ−induced norm, since T2 is maximally monotone
by Lemma 3 (i). By [11, Prop. 23.7], the resolvent mapping
(Id + Φ−1T2) is
1
2−averaged (or firmly-nonexpansive, see
[11, Remark 4.24]) in the Φ−induced norm, since Φ−1T2 is
maximally monotone in the same norm.
Lemma 11: Let Assumptions 1, 5 hold and the step-sizes
{αi, βi}i∈I satisfy Assumption 6. Then, the pFB operator
R = (Id + Φ−1T2)
−1 ◦ (Id − Φ−1T1) is ν−averaged in the
Φ−induced norm (i.e., ‖ · ‖Φ), with ν := 2δτ4δτ−1 ∈ (12 , 1). 
Proof: By [31, Proposition 2.4], the mapping R is(
2δτ
4δτ−1
)
−averaged with respect to ‖ · ‖Φ, since composition
of (Id + Φ−1T2)
−1 and (Id − Φ−1T1) which are 12− and
1
2δτ−averaged in ‖·‖Φ, respectively, by Lemma 10. Moreover,
2δτ
4δτ−1 ∈ (12 , 1), since τ > 12δ , by Assumption 6.
The fixed-point iteration (15), that corresponds to Algorithm
2 by the first part of this proof, is the Krasnosel’skii-Mann
iteration on the mapping R, which is ν−averaged, with ν ∈
(12 , 1), by Lemma 11. The convergence of (15) to some ω
∗ :=
col(x∗,λ∗) ∈ fix(R) follows by [11, Prop. 5.15]. To conclude,
we note that ω∗ ∈ fix(R) = zer(Φ−1T1 + Φ−1T2), by [11,
Prop. 25.1 (iv)], and that zer(Φ−1T1+Φ
−1T2) = zer(T ), with
T as in (11), since Φ ≻ 0, by Lemma 9 (i), and T1+T2 = T .
Since the limit point ω∗ ∈ zer(T ) 6= ∅, by Proposition 2 (i),
then x∗ is a v-GNE of the game in (1), by Proposition 2 (ii),
thus concluding the proof. 
D. Proof of Lemma 4
We prove equation (i) by induction. At step zero, σ¯0 = x¯0
holds if the estimates are initialized as σ0i = x
0
i , for all i ∈ I.
At step k, we assume that σ¯k = x¯k. To conclude the proof,
we show that relation (i) holds at step k + 1:
σ¯k+1 = 1N (1
⊤ ⊗ In)((W (k) ⊗ In)σk + xk+1 − xk),
= 1N (1
⊤ ⊗ In)(W (k) ⊗ In)σk + x¯k+1 − x¯k,
= σ¯k + x¯k+1 − x¯k = x¯k+1.
The first equality follows from the updating rule of the σi’s in
Algorithm 3, the second follows by definition of x¯k , i.e., x¯k =
1
N (1
⊤⊗In)xk, the third follows since the mixing matrixW (k)
is column stochastic, i.e., 1⊤W (k) = 1⊤, by Assumption 3,
while the last equality follows from the induction step k, i.e.,
σ¯k = x¯k. The proof of equations (ii) and (iii) are analogous.
E. Proof of Lemma 5
For easy of notation, this proof is developed for the scalar
case, i.e., n = m = 1. In this case, we can write ‖σˆk − 1⊗
x¯k‖ = ‖(W (k)⊗ In)σk − 1⊗ x¯k‖ = ‖W (k)σk − x¯k1‖.
(i): The update of the estimates σi’s in Algorithm 3 can be
written in a compact form as
σk+1 =W (k)σk + xk+1 − xk. (41)
By telescoping (41), we obtain
σk+1 = W (k)(W (k − 1)σk−1 + xk − xk−1)
+ xk+1 − xk
= Ψ(k, k − 1)σk−1 +Ψ(k, k)(xk − xk−1)
+ xk+1 − xk
= · · ·
= Ψ(k, 0)σ0 +
∑k
s=1Ψ(k, s)(x
s − xs−1)
+ xk+1 − xk. (42)
Since σk+1 − xk+1 + xk = W (k)σk, by (41), it follows by
(42) that
W (k)σk = Ψ(k, 0)σ0 +
∑k
s=1Ψ(k, s)(x
s − xs−1).
Now, consider σ¯k, which may be written as follows:
σ¯k = σ¯k−1 + (σ¯k − σ¯k−1) = σ¯0 +∑ks=1(σ¯s − σ¯s−1).
By Lemma 4, we have that σ¯s = x¯s ∀s ≥ 0, which leads to
x¯k = σ¯k = σ¯0 +
∑k
s=1(x¯
s − x¯s−1)
= 1N 1
⊤σ0 +
∑k
s=1
1
N 1
⊤(xs − xs−1). (43)
From equations (42) and (43), we have the following:
‖W (k)σk − x¯k1‖
= ‖(Ψ(k, 0)− 1N 11⊤)σ0
+
∑k
s=1(Ψ(k, s)− 1N 11⊤)(xs − xs−1)‖
≤ ‖Ψ(k, 0)− 1N 11⊤‖‖σ0‖
+
∑k
s=1 ‖Ψ(k, s)− 1N 11⊤‖‖xs − xs−1‖
≤ θρk‖σ0‖+∑ks=1 θρk−s‖xs − xs−1‖ (44)
The last inequality follows since ‖Ψ(k, s)− 1N 11⊤‖ ≤ θρk−s
for all k ≥ s ≥ 0, by Lemma 1. Next, we find an upper
bound for ‖xs −xs−1‖. The update of the decisions xi’s can
be written in a compact form as xk+1 = xk + γk(x˜k − xk).
We note that x˜ki , x
k
i ∈ Ωi, for all k ≥ 0 since x˜ki is obtained
by projecting onto Ωi and x
k
i = (1 − γk)xk−1i + γkx˜ki is a
convex combination of elements of the convex set Ωi. Since
all the sets Ωi are compact, by Assumption 1, it follows that
for some constant BΩ, we have
‖xs − xs−1‖ = γs−1‖x˜s−1 − xs−1‖ ≤ γs−1BΩ. (45)
By combining (45) and (44), we obtain
‖W (k)σk − x¯k1‖ ≤ θρkBΩ +
∑k
s=1 θρ
k−sγs−1BΩ,
where we exploited the initialization step σ0 = x0 ∈ Ω, from
which ‖σ0‖ ≤ BΩ.
(ii): The update of the estimates zi’s in Algorithm 3 can be
written in a compact form as
zk+1 = W (k)zk + λk+1 − λk. (46)
By telescoping (46), we obtain
‖W (k)zk − λ¯k1‖
≤ θρk‖z0‖+∑ks=1 θρk−s‖λs − λs−1‖, (47)
Now, we estimate ‖λs − λs−1‖. The update of the decisions
λi’s can be written in a compact form as λ
k+1 = λk+γk(λ˜
k−
λk). We note that λ˜ki , λ
k
i ∈ D, for all k ≥ 0 since λ˜ki is
obtained by projecting onto D and λki = (1−γk)λk−1i +γkλ˜ki
is a convex combination of elements of the convex setD. Since
D is compact, it follows that for some constant BD, we have
‖W (k)zk − λ¯k1‖ ≤ θρkBD +
∑k
s=1 θρ
k−sγs−1BD.
(iii): The update of the estimates yi’s in Algorithm 3 can
be written in a compact form as
yk+1 = W (k)yk + Cd(2x˜
k − xk)
− Cd(2x˜k−1 − xk−1). (48)
By telescoping (48), we obtain
yk+1 = Ψ(k, 0)y0 +
∑k
s=1Ψ(k, s)
· (Cd(2x˜s−1 − xs−1)− Cd(2x˜s−2 − xs−2))
+ Cd(2x˜
k − xk)− Cd(2x˜k−1 − xk−1). (49)
Now, consider y¯k, which may be written as follows:
y¯k = y¯0 +
∑k
s=1{y¯s−1 − y¯s−2}+ y¯k − y¯k−1.
By Lemma 4, we have that y¯s = d¯s = 1N 1
⊤Cd(2x˜
s−xs)−c,
for all s ≥ 0, which leads to
y¯k = 1N 1
⊤y0 +
∑k
s=1
1
N 1
⊤
· (Cd(2x˜s−1 − xs−1)− Cd(2x˜s−2 − xs−2))
+ 1N 1
⊤
(
Cd(2x˜
k − xk)− Cd(2x˜k−1 − xk−1)
)
. (50)
From the relations (49) and (50), we have the following:
‖yk+1 − d¯k1‖
= ‖(Ψ(k, 0)− 1N 11⊤)y0 +
∑k
s=1(Ψ(k, s)− 1N 11⊤)
· (Cd(2x˜s−1 − xs−1)− Cd(2x˜s−2 − xs−2))
+ (IN − 1N 11⊤)
· (Cd(2x˜k − xk)− Cd(2x˜k−1 − xk−1))‖
≤ ‖Ψ(k, 0)− 1N 11⊤‖‖y0‖
+
∑k
s=1 ‖Ψ(k, s)− 1N 11⊤‖‖Cd‖
· ‖(2x˜s−1 − xs−1)− (2x˜s−2 − xs−2)‖
+ ‖Cd‖‖(2x˜k − xk)− (2x˜k−1 − xk−1)‖
≤ θρkBY +
∑k
s=1 θρ
k−s
· ‖Cd‖‖(2x˜s−1 − xs−1)− (2x˜s−2 − xs−2)‖
+ ‖Cd‖‖(2x˜k − xk)− (2x˜k−1 − xk−1)‖, (51)
where the last inequality follows since ‖Ψ(k, s)− 1N 11⊤‖ ≤
θρk−s for all k ≥ s ≥ 0, by Lemma 1. Now we upper bound
‖(2x˜s − xs)− (2x˜s−1 − xs−1)‖.
‖(2x˜s − xs)− (2x˜s−1 − xs−1)‖
≤ 2‖x˜s − x˜s−1‖+ ‖xs − xs−1‖
≤ 2‖x˜s − x˜s−1‖+ γs−1BΩ, (52)
where the second inequality follows from (45). Consider the
term ‖x˜s− x˜s−1‖. By exploiting the compact update (20) and
the nonexpansiveness of the projection operator, we have
‖x˜s − x˜s−1‖
≤ ‖xs−1 − xs−2 − α¯
· (F˜ (xs−1,W (s−1)σs−1)− F˜ (xs−2,W (s−2)σs−2)
+ C⊤d W (s−1)zs−1 − C⊤d W (s−2)zs−2
)‖
≤ ‖xs−1 − xs−2‖
+ LF˜ ‖αd‖ ‖
[
xs−1 − xs−2
W (s− 1)σs−1 −W (s− 2)σs−2
]
‖
+ ‖αd‖‖Cd‖‖W (s− 1)zs−1 −W (s− 2)zs−2‖
≤ γs−2BΩ + LF˜‖αd‖‖xs−1 − xs−2‖
+ LF˜ ‖αd‖‖W (s−1)σs−1 −W (s−2)σs−2‖
+ ‖α¯‖‖Cd‖‖W (s−1)zs−1 −W (s−2)zs−2‖, (53)
where the second inequality follows from the Lipschitz conti-
nuity of F˜ , while the last inequality follows from the relation
‖ [ ab ] ‖ =
√‖a‖2 + ‖b‖2 ≤ ‖a‖ + ‖b‖. Now, we upper
bound the last two terms in (53). Since W (s− 2)σs−2 =
σs−1 − xs−1 + xs−2 by (41), then we can write
‖W (s−1)σs−1 −W (s−2)σs−2‖
= ‖W (s−1)σs−1 − σs−1 + xs−1 − xs−2‖
≤ ‖W (s−1)σs−1 − σs−1‖+ ‖xs−1 − xs−2‖
= ‖W (s−1)σs−1 − 1x¯s−1 − (σs−1 − 1x¯s−1)‖
+ ‖xs−1 − xs−2‖
≤ ‖W (s−1)σs−1 − 1x¯s−1‖+ ‖σs−1 − 1x¯s−1‖
+ γs−2BΩ
≤ θBΩρs−1 + θBΩ
∑s−1
ℓ=1 ρ
(s−1)−ℓγℓ−1
+ θBΩρ
s−2 + θBΩ
∑s−2
ℓ=1 ρ
(s−2)−ℓγℓ−1 + γs−2BΩ
+ γs−2BΩ
≤ 2θBΩρs−2 + 4θBΩ
∑s−1
ℓ=1 ρ
(s−1)−ℓγℓ−1. (54)
The third inequality follows by substituting to ‖W (s −
1)σs−1 − 1x¯s−1‖ and ‖σs−1 − 1x¯s−1‖ the upper bound
derived in Lemma 5 (i). Equivalently, for the last addend is
(53), we can write
‖W (s−1)zs−1 −W (s−2)zs−2‖
≤ 2θBDρs−2 + 4θBD
∑s−1
ℓ=1 ρ
(s−1)−ℓγℓ−1. (55)
By combining (53) with (54) and (55), we obtain
‖x˜s − x˜s−1‖
≤ ‖αd‖2θ(LF˜BΩ + ‖Cd‖BD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=ǫ1
ρs−2
+ ‖αd‖4θ(LF˜BΩ + ‖Cd‖BD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=ǫ2
∑s−1
ℓ=1 ρ
(s−1)−ℓγℓ−1
+ (BΩ + ‖αd‖LF˜BΩ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=ǫ3
γs−2
≤ ǫ1ρs−2 + (ǫ2 + ǫ3)
∑s−1
ℓ=1 ρ
(s−1)−ℓγℓ−1 (56)
By substituting (56) into (52), we obtain
‖(2x˜s − xs)− (2x˜s−1 − xs−1)‖
≤ 2ǫ1ρs−2 + 2(ǫ2 + ǫ3)
∑s−1
ℓ=1 ρ
(s−1)−ℓγℓ−1 + γs−1BΩ
≤ 2ǫ1︸︷︷︸
:=δ1
ρs−2 + (2ǫ2 + 2ǫ3 +BΩ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=δ2
∑s−1
ℓ=1 ρ
(s−1)−ℓγℓ−1
= φs−1, (57)
with (φk)k∈N as in (24). The second inequality follows since
γs−1 ≤ γs−2, by Assumption 3. Finally, by combining (57)
and (51), we obtain the upper bound in Lemma 5 (iii). 
F. Proof of Lemma 7
From ‖ [ ab ] ‖ =
√‖a‖2 + ‖b‖2 ≤ ‖a‖+ ‖b‖, it follows that
‖ek‖ = ‖ col(x˜k, λ˜k)− col(x˜kA2, λ˜
k
A2)‖
≤ ‖x˜k − x˜kA2‖+ ‖λ˜
k − λ˜kA2‖. (58)
Consider ‖x˜k−x˜kA2‖, where x˜k and x˜kA2 are defined in (20)
and (18), respectively. By exploiting the nonexpansiveness of
the projection, we can write
‖x˜k − x˜kA2‖
≤ ‖αd‖ ‖F˜ (xk, σˆk)− F˜ (xk, x¯k) + C⊤d (zˆk − λˆ
k
)‖
≤ LF˜ ‖αd‖‖(W (k)⊗ In)σk − 1⊗ x¯k‖
+ ‖αd‖‖Cd‖‖(W (k)⊗ Im)zk − 1⊗ λ¯k‖, (59)
where the second inequality follows by the triangular inequal-
ity and the Lipschitz continuity of F˜ (Assumption 4).
Now, consider ‖λ˜k − λ˜kA2‖, where λ˜
k
and λ˜
k
A2 are defined
in (21) and (19), respectively. By exploiting the nonexpansive-
ness of the projection, we have
‖λ˜k − λ˜kA2‖ ≤ ‖βd‖‖(W (k)⊗ Im)zk − 1⊗ λ¯k‖
+ ‖βd‖‖yk+1 − 1⊗ d¯k‖. (60)
Finally, by combining (60) and (59) with (58) we obtain the
upper bound in Lemma 7. 
G. Proof of Lemma 8
By substituting the bounds on the estimation errors of
Lemma 5 into the error bound in Lemma 7, we obtain
γk‖ek‖ ≤ a1 γkρk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term 1
+a2 γ
k
k∑
s=1
ρk−sγs−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term 2
+ a3 γ
kφk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term 3
+a4 γ
k
k∑
s=1
ρk−sφs−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term4
, (61)
where a1, a2, a3 and a4 are positive constants defined
as a1 := θBΩ(‖αd‖LF˜ + ‖βd‖) + θBD(‖α¯‖‖Cd‖ + ‖β¯‖),
a2 := θBΩ‖α¯‖LF˜ + θBD(‖α¯‖‖Cd‖ + ‖β¯‖), a3 := ‖β¯‖‖Cd‖
and a4 := ‖β¯‖. Now, we show that each term on the right-
hand side of (61) is summable, hence also the sequence
(γk‖ek‖)k∈N is such, i.e.,
∑∞
k=0 γ
k‖ek‖ <∞.
Term 1: To establish the convergence of
∑∞
k=0 γ
kρk, we
note that γk ≤ γ0 for all k ∈ N by Assumption 7, implying
that
∑∞
k=0 γ
kρk ≤ γ0∑∞k=0 ρk < ∞, since 0 < ρ < 1 by
Lemma 1.
Term 2: Since γk ≤ γs−1, for all k ≥ s−1 (Assumption
7), the following relations hold for the second term in the
right-hand side of (61):
∞∑
k=0
γk
(
k∑
s=1
ρk−sγs−1
)
=
∞∑
k=0
k∑
s=1
ρk−sγkγs−1
≤
∞∑
k=0
k∑
s=1
ρk−s(γs−1)2.
It follows by Lemma 6 (b) that
∑∞
k=0
∑k
s=1 ρ
k−s(γs−1)2 <
∞, since ∑∞k=0(γk)2 <∞, γk ≥ 0 for all k (Assumption 7)
and 0 < ρ < 1.
Term 3: By exploting the definition of the sequence (φk)k∈N
in Lemma 5, we can write
∞∑
k=0
γkφk =
∞∑
k=0
γk
(
δ1ρ
k−1 + δ2
k∑
ℓ=1
ρk−ℓγℓ−1
)
= δ1
∞∑
k=0
γkρk−1 + δ2
∞∑
k=0
γk
k∑
ℓ=1
ρk−ℓγℓ−1
≤ δ1γ0
∞∑
k=0
ρk−1 + δ2
∞∑
k=0
k∑
ℓ=1
ρk−ℓ(γℓ−1)2
By exploiting the same technical reasoning in (i) and (ii), we
can show that each term on the right-hand side of the previous
inequality globally converges. Therefore, we conclude that∑∞
k=0 γ
kφk <∞.
Term 4: Since γk ≤ γs, for all k ≥ s (Assumption 7), the
following relations hold for the last term in the right-hand side
of (61):
∞∑
k=0
γk
(
k∑
s=1
ρk−sφs−1
)
=
∞∑
k=0
k∑
s=1
ρk−sγkφs−1
≤
∞∑
k=0
k∑
s=1
ρk−s(γs−1φs−1).
It follows by Lemma 6 (b) that
∑∞
k=0
∑k
s=1 ρ
k−sγs−1φs−1 <
∞, since ∑∞k=0 γkφk <∞ by (iii), and 0 < ρ < 1.
To conclude, since all the terms in the right-hand side of (61)
are summable, then we have
∑∞
k=0 γ
k‖ek‖ <∞. 
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